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Abstract
This study examines spatial variation in the price and accessibility of fast food across a major
urban area.  We use novel data on the price of a representative fast food meal and the location of
fast food restaurants belonging to one of three major chains in the District of Columbia and its
surrounding suburbs.  These data are used to test a structural model of spatial competition. The
results of this study are easily interpreted and compared with a past analysis.  We find that spatial
differences in costs and demand conditions drive variation in the number of firms operating in a
market, which in turn affects prices.
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11.  Introduction
Who pays more for food?  This question has been a subject of debate among researchers.
Most focus on prices at supermarkets and other grocers, and ask whether retail food prices tend
to be higher in markets with a greater proportion of lower income consumers, minority
consumers, or consumers with some other trait. Recent studies include Frankel and Gould
(2001), Hayes (2000), Kaufman et al (1997), as well as MacDonald and Nelson (1991).  A few
other studies have examined prices at restaurants, such as LaFontaine (1995), Graddy (1997),
Jekanowski (1998), and Thomadsen (2003).
Being able to explain variation in average retail food prices could be useful for
government agencies engaged in price measurement.  However, it has also been a goal of
researchers who are concerned with social equity.  According to Graddy (1997), there is a
perception that retailers engage in “unfair” commercial practices in lower income, minority
neighborhoods, and she points out that retail establishments have been targeted during some riots
in urban centers.
Empirical evidence does confirm some systematic dispersion of prices.  According to
Kaufman et al (1997), who conducted a review of fourteen prior studies, grocery prices tend to
be higher in urban centers than in suburban markets.  Some speculate that greater access to
supermarkets in the suburbs is responsible.  As compared with central city stores, supermarkets
are argued to offer the lowest prices and the greatest range of brands, package sizes, and quality
choices.  MacDonald and Nelson (1991) find that a fixed market basket of goods costs about 4
percent less in suburban locations than in central city stores. However, they concede that their
2analysis is not based firmly in economic theory; rather it is only exploratory, owing to the lack of
a precise model.
Studies have been less successful at explaining how and why prices might vary with the
demographic characteristics of a market.  First, recent studies of grocery prices have reached
mixed results.  For example, Hayes (2000) does not identify a statistically significant relationship
between grocery prices and the income level of a market’s residents.  By contrast, Frankel and
Gould (2001) find that prices are highest in markets with more income inequality.  In other
words, prices are found to be highest where there are more lower income or more higher income
households.  The lowest prices are found in markets with more consumers in between these two
groups.  Second, even when they are significant, there is the problem of interpreting estimation
results.  For example, the model of Frankel and Gould (2001) does not allow those authors to
determine whether their findings are due to differences in consumer behavior, costs, or
differences in the characteristics of stores and the quality of the services they provide.
Similar results have been obtained by researchers studying restaurant prices.  For
example, Graddy (1997) finds that prices are higher in neighborhoods with a higher proportion
of Black and lower income consumers.  However, her model does not identify whether the
observed dispersion of prices stems from differences in costs and demand conditions, or whether
it reflects discriminatory pricing strategies among retailers.
Utilizing a novel set of data on the price of a fast food meal and the location of fast food
restaurants in a major urban area, this study tests the structural model of spatial competition
developed by Salop (1979).  Estimation results based on this model can be easily interpreted.
According to this model, cost and demand conditions first determine how many stores choose to
locate in a market.  Holding all other factors constant, the more firms in a market, the greater
3access consumers will have to establishments on average.  Greater access is defined to mean that
consumers will have lower transportation costs and better substitutes for the services of any
particular store.  Stores will likewise have less market power and price more competitively.
This study focuses on fast food prices, because the authors believe such an analysis may
be more easily undertaken than studies of grocery prices.  Arguably, two different outlets
affiliated with the same fast food chain supply relatively homogeneous goods and services.  This
fact may alleviate the possibility that differences in store formats are confounding the results of
studies on grocery prices, such as central city stores being smaller or offering a narrower range
of goods and services than suburban supermarkets1.
The results of this study show that cost and demand factors influence prices through their
effect on access.  For example, consider a community where an increase occurs in demand, such
as through an increase in the population or in the income of existing residents.  Holding all else
constant, this study finds that firms would likely respond by opening more outlets in the
community.  Consumers would then have more and better substitutes for the services of any
particular store.  In turn, restaurants would have more competitors, less market power, and
charge slightly lower prices.  In this way, low population levels and low levels of income might
be associated with not only more limited access, but also higher prices.  Moreover, we show that
the reduced form of our model closely resembles the type of model estimated in past studies,
including Graddy (1997), against which we compare our results.
                                                
1 For example, in examining grocery prices, MacDonald and Nelson (1991) find it necessary to control for the type
of retail format at which groceries are purchased.  Variables include whether the retail store is a supermarket or a
warehouse club, the size of a store in square feet, and the scope of services offered by a store such as whether there
is a delicatessen, and a meat or seafood counter. By contrast, the authors feel that these types of variation do not
confound analyses of fast food prices.  Two McDonald’s restaurants in separate locations have a relatively similar
format and offer a relatively similar range of goods and services.
42. Theoretical Framework
In models of spatial monopolistic competition, consumers are dispersed over a market area that
is represented with a line, circle, or other geometric form.  Hotelling (1929) proposes a linear
market, while Salop (1979) extends Hotelling’s model and develops a circular market with an
outside, homogeneous good.  In that model, the homogeneous good is supplied by a competitive
industry.  In addition, there are also spatially dispersed firms, who share a common fixed cost,
incur a constant marginal cost of production, and sell a second product.  The supply of this
second good is monopolistically competitive.  A number of researchers have further expanded on
models of spatial competition including work by Capozza and Van Order (1978), Capozza and
Van Order (1980), MacLeod et al (1988), Rath and Zhao (2001), and Puu (2002).
In Salop’s (1979) model, a consumer’s costs for purchasing the second good include the
retail price (i.e., the “mill” price) and his or her costs for transportation to a retail store.2  It is
assumed that only if the total cost of obtaining the second item is below the consumer’s
reservation cost will the consumer purchase a given number of units of this good.3  The
consumer will buy only the homogeneous good otherwise.  Significant transportation costs can
therefore prevent suppliers of the second good from concentrating all of their production in one
location.  Customers may incur a prohibitively large cost for travel to this concentrated site.
                                                
2 It is assumed that there is no price discrimination; rather all consumers pay the same mill price.  For a discussion of
price discrimination, see MacLeod et al (1988). They derive the subgame perfect equilibrium in a two-stage game in
which firms are allowed to adjust their mill prices according to a consumer’s costs for transportation.  It is shown
that firms may charge higher prices to their nearest consumers.  The reason is that these consumers consider farther
away stores a relatively poor substitute for their nearest store.  Such consumers face a relatively high cost
differential for traveling to their nearest store and the next nearest one.  By contrast, this cost differential is relatively
small for consumers who are located a relatively far distance from any store.
3 Salop claims that his model can be readily extended to consider elastic demand. For example, see Puu (2002) as
well as by Rath and Zhao (2001), who demonstrate the equilibria in models of a linear market.
5Competition among suppliers of the second good is imperfect in the model of Salop
(1979).  Because they incur a non-zero cost of transportation, consumers prefer to patronize the
nearest firm if mill prices are equal.  The demand for goods from firm i is then a function of the
price of i and the price of all other firms who are sufficiently close to i.  Using this model, Salop
(1979) derives the demand schedule facing a representative firm, and shows that prices for the
second good are a function of transportation costs due to their impact on a firm’s market power.
Prices for the second good may decrease with the number of firms in a market under
some assumptions about firm behavior.  Salop (1979) shows that, as the number of firms in a
market increases, each firm will be spatially closer to one of its rivals.  Consumers may have
more and better substitutes for the goods offered by any single firm.  In general, the price
charged by firm i will move closer to i’s marginal cost.  A necessary assumption about firm
behavior is that each firm chooses a best price, given the perception that all other firms hold their
prices constant.4  Empirical evidence that prices tend to decrease with the number of firms in a
market has been provided by Bresnahan and Reiss (1991).
The number of firms in a market is determined in advance of prices.  In the model of
Salop (1979), just enough firms enter a market so that, once prices are later determined,
economic profits will be zero.5  The resulting equilibrium is termed a symmetric zero profit Nash
equilibrium.  For instance, given a distribution of firms who are poised to make zero economic
profits, a decrease in fixed costs or an increase in demand would allow for positive economic
profits.  New firms will then enter the market, and, in turn, each firm’s market share will
                                                
4 Capozza and Van Order (1978) present a general case allowing for a wider range of assumptions about firm
behavior.
5 Firms in the model of Salop (1979) are “portable.”  As further argued in Capozza and Van Order (1980),
portability requires that firms can relocate when new firms enter a market.  However, if existing firms are immobile,
then this equilibrium condition must be restated such that firms will enter a market if and only if they can expect to
make positive economic profits.  In other words, entry is sequentially rational.  
6decrease.  Expected profits then fall with market shares. This process will continue until all firms
can once again expect to earn only a zero economic profit.
In this study, we use the model of Salop (1979) to motivate a system of structural
equations which serve as the basis for an empirical analysis.  We assume that there are M
circular markets and consumers in each market are spatially dispersed.  We denote the aggregate
demand of consumers in each of these markets, m=1,…,M, as Dm.  We allow Dm to vary with the
number of consumers in each market.  Moreover, we allow the demand for fast food to depend
on the social and demographic characteristics of the consumers.  However, for prices below the
consumer’s reservation cost, quantity demanded does not vary with price; rather consumer
demand is inelastic.  Consumers pay the retail price and incur a non-zero cost for traveling to
restaurants.  In market m, let the number of restaurants be Nm and all other factors that influence
transportation costs be Tm.  There is free entry and Nm is determined such that economic profits
are zero.  Also, we assume that the fixed cost associated with operating a restaurant varies across
markets, but not within markets.  Let this fixed cost in market m be Cm.
Continuing to follow Salop (1979), we hypothesize that Nm is decreasing in Cm but
increasing in Dm and Tm. Thus, our model of Nm is
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Similarly, we allow for the possibility that prices in a market depend upon the marginal costs of
firms in that market (MCm) as well as Nm and Tm.  The price of a meal in market m, Pm, is then
)N,T ,MCP(P m
-
mmm
++
= . (2)
where (1) and (2) represent a system of simultaneous (triangular) equations.
Finally, if one desires, we note that (2) can be substituted into (1) to obtain a reduced
form equation for fast food price,
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where Nm no longer appears as a separate regressor. This equation approximates the reduced
form model used in Graddy (1997).6  
4. Data and Empirical Model
We next document our data sources and develop an empirical representation of the
equations in the previous section.  We collected data on the prices and locations of McDonald’s,
Burger King, and Wendy’s restaurants in the District of Columbia and its surrounding suburbs.7
We identified stores using local telephone directories, web-based telephone directories, and
company websites.8  In total, we identified 328 restaurants and collected price information on
253 of them during the late Summer and Fall of 2002.9  At each of these stores, we recorded the
price of a number one value meal which includes a hamburger sandwich, a soda, and fries.
Among McDonald’s and Burger King restaurants, value meals were sold in medium, large, and
extra-large sizes.  We priced the large size.  However, among Wendy’s restaurants, value meals
were sold in only two sizes, a regular size and Biggie™.  We priced the regular size. Finally, we
                                                
6 Following the notation in this study, the dependent variable in the model of Graddy (1997) is the price of food at
restaurant i in zip code m.  A notable difference between this specification and that of Salop (1979) is that the model
of Graddy (1997) treats individual stores as the level of analysis, not the market. Explanatory variables in the model
of Graddy (1997) include a few store-specific controls, such as the number of employees, as well as many zip code-
level proxies for costs, the competitive environment, and the demographic characteristics of that zip code’s
residents, such as their race and income level.
7 These suburbs include Montgomery and Prince George counties in Maryland as well as Fairfax County, Arlington
County, and Alexandria City in Virginia.
8 Each of the three fast food chains under study has a restaurant locator on their website.
9 We collected prices by visiting restaurants and by phoning restaurants.  Among restaurants contacted by telephone,
unusual price information was confirmed by re-phoning or visiting the establishment.  Collecting accurate price data
by telephone can be problematic.  Graddy (1997) used data collected by Card and Krueger (1994), and notes how
other researchers have found problems with these data.  She cites one researcher, Lavin (1995), who comments that
restaurant employees do not appear to have always given accurate price data.  For instance, some employees at
Burger King restaurants may have reported the price for a “Whopper” when asked for the price of a regular
8supplemented our price and location data with information on the economic and demographic
characteristics of the zip codes in which restaurants are located.  Some of these data were taken
from Census 2000, including the number of people living in the zip code, the racial and ethnic
characteristics of residents, the median household income, the average age of residents, and the
proportion of households containing children.  Other data were taken from Realtor.com, a
website with real estate listings, including the median value of homes in a zip code.  Finally, we
obtained data on the size of each zip code in square miles from the ArcView™ software package.
Complete data could be collected for 97 zip codes in which we also had located restaurants.10
As an initial step, we demonstrate that there exists a dispersion of prices and accessibility
in the region under study.  Table 1 shows that the mean number of restaurants belonging to one
of the three chains was 3.08 with a standard deviation of 1.68 among the 97 zip codes used in our
analysis.  As for price dispersion, Figure 1 further shows the distribution of prices at McDonald’s
and Burger King establishments in our sample.  Sampled restaurants affiliated with McDonald’s
were frequently charging $4.09 or $4.19 for a large, number one value meal.  At the same time,
other stores were selling this same meal for as little as $3.89 and as much as $4.56.  Similarly,
restaurants affiliated with Burger King were frequently found to be charging $4.79 for their
large, number one value meal.   However, we also observed prices as low as $4.29 and as high as
$5.09.  By contrast, among restaurants affiliated with the Wendy’s chain, all sampled
establishments were charging $3.99 for a regular, number one meal11.
                                                                                                                                                            
hamburger.  We formulated our sampling strategy to minimize this problem.  However, because of time constraints,
we ultimately could not obtain reliable price data on all establishments.
10 For some markets, in which we had identified restaurants, we could not obtain pertinent data about the zip code,
such as the cost of a home.  In fact, there were 300 restaurants in the 97 zip codes for which we also had complete
data. Our price data covered 240 of these 300 establishments.
11 This result might surprise some readers who would expect to pay the same price at two restaurants affiliated with
the same chain.  However, it is important to consider that most fast food restaurants are owned and operated by
franchisees. Moreover, resale price maintenance is illegal in the United States.  In other words, large restaurant
companies have direct control over prices at only company-owned outlets.  Franchisees are free to set their own
9Following Graddy (1997) and LaFontaine (1995), we next assume that separate zip codes
are separate markets.12  For each market, we calculate the average price (without tax) of a meal,
Pm, as well as the number of restaurants affiliated with any of the three restaurant chains, Nm.13
These two variables serve as the dependent variables in our analysis.14
Among the explanatory variables in the empirical specification of our model, we proxy
for fixed costs, Cm, in equation (1) with the median price of a house, measured in hundreds of
thousands of dollars, HOUSE.  We hypothesize that the number of restaurants in a market is
decreasing in fixed costs, and therefore, HOUSE. 15  We also include several variables in (1) to
account for aggregate demand, Dm.  Demand is thought to depend upon the number of consumers
in the market and so we include the zip code population in tens of thousands of people, POP.
Following Stewart et al (2004), Byrne et al (1998), and McCracken and Brandt (1987), we also
include variables shown to influence per capita spending on fast food.  These include the median
                                                                                                                                                            
prices. While LaFontaine (1995) finds that prices vary even across company-owned stores, price dispersion is
greatest among establishments owned by franchisees.
12 The use of zip codes to proxy for markets is admittedly imperfect.  Instead of assuming a zip code to approximate
a market, Thomadsen (2003) treats the size of a market as endogenous.  That model facilitates his analysis of price
competition among restaurants.  However, the model of Thomadsen (2003) focuses on the second stage of a
location-price game.  In other words, he analyzes the prices charged by firms, given that they have entered the
market.  He does not consider how access to fast food can vary with the demographic characteristics of a market’s
residents, such as their income level, or the determinants of fixed costs in a market, such as the cost of housing.
13 As mentioned earlier, we could not obtain price data on all restaurants in all zip codes.  In these cases, Pm is the
average price of a meal at restaurants from which prices were obtained.  However, Nm remains the number of
restaurants in the zip code, regardless of whether price data were obtained on each establishment.
14 As noted in footnote 6, unlike Graddy (1997), we aggregate our data to the zip code-level.  We feel that this
approach better reflects the model of Salop (1979), which is of a market, not of a firm.  Moreover, as discussed
below, our independent variables include the income level of a market’s residents, the number of people living in a
market, and other characteristics of the market in which a restaurant is located.  It follows that there is almost no
variation in the value of the independent variables associated with different stores in the same zip code.  Only if two
stores in the same zip code belong to different chains, could there be some variation in the value of an indicator
variable for store-affiliation.  Moulton (1986) has shown that estimation, using a cross-section of data in which
many observations share the same (or similar) values for their independent variables, can lead to a serious
underestimation of the standard errors on the coefficients.  Aggregating data to the zip-code level further removes
this possibility.
15 In the estimation of the model, we also experimented with separate dummy variables for whether a restaurant was
located in the District of Columbia, Montgomery County, Prince George County, Fairfax County, Arlington County,
or Alexandria City.  The reason is that insurance rates tend to vary by county and past researchers have asked
whether these rates impact fixed costs.  However, in our study, these variables were never significant nor did they
influence the sign and significance of the other variables in the model.
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income of residents measured in tens of thousands of dollars (INCOME), the median age of
residents (AGE), and the proportion of households with a child (KIDS).
We also use several variables to proxy for factors other than Nm thought to affect the cost
of transportation in a market, Tm.16  In particular, it is hypothesized that residents of rural,
suburban, and urban areas may have different costs for transportation.  Some rural areas are
geographically larger than urban ones.  Holding all else constant, it follows that residents of rural
areas may tend to travel farther distances than their urban counterparts.  However, residents of
urban areas may be less likely to own a car and, if they do drive, have more difficulty parking or
face more congested roads.  Thus, we created dummy variables to proxy for the three types of
community.  RURAL = 1 for markets outside the Beltway with fewer than 1,500 residents per
square mile, and RURAL = 0 for all other zip codes17. CITY is coded similarly except that it
identifies inner-city markets with more than 9,000 residents per square mile inside the Beltway.
Including these two variables in the model, we contrast areas classified as RURAL and CITY
with more suburban communities, SUBURBAN, the reference market.
In the empirical specification of (2), we include Nm, RURAL and CITY to control for
transportation costs, Tm, as well as other variables to account for differences in marginal costs,
MCm. Variables controlling for marginal costs include three binary indicators of the county in
which a zip code is located. These are MNT = 1 if the market (zip code) is in Montgomery
County, MD, and 0 otherwise; VA=1 if the market is anywhere in Virginia, and 0 otherwise;
PG=1 if the market is in Prince George’s County, MD, and 0 otherwise.18  Markets in the District
                                                
16 We also tried using the proportion of residents without a car in our model.  However, it was highly collinear with
INCOME as well as the variables RURAL and CITY, discussed in this paragraph.
17 The Beltway is a highway encircling the District of Columbia and its inner suburbs.
18 In place of VA, we also tried using separate indicator variables for Fairfax County, Arlington County, and
Alexandria City.  These places are all in Virginia.  However, with the exception of Fairfax County, they are also
relatively small in geographic terms. Likewise, we had few observations for Arlington County and Alexandria City,
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of Columbia, DC, serve as the reference market.  Marginal costs can be expected to vary by
county, because the counties have different sales tax rates and, very likely, different wage rates.
We also allow marginal costs to vary across chains.  The marginal cost at McDonald’s
may differ from that at Burger King, for example.  If so, because we aggregate our data to the zip
code level, it follows that the average level of marginal costs in a zip code will depend upon the
portion of all restaurants belonging to each chain.  Thus, we include in MCm the proportion of
restaurants used in the calculation of Pm belonging to McDonald’s (MCD), Burger King (BK),
and Wendy’s (WNDY).
We assume a linear relationship between variables, and substituting the relevant variables
into equations (1) and (2) yields the following set of triangular equations:
N  =  a0 + a1CITY + a2RURAL + a3HOUSE + a4INCOME + a5KIDS + a6AGE + a7POP     (4)
P  =  ß0 + ß1MNT + ß2VA + ß3PG + ß4WNDY + ß5BK + ß6CITY+ ß7RURAL+ ß8N.              (5)
Appending (4) and (5) with stochastic error terms creates the equations that are the basis for our
econometric analysis.  If these error terms have zero covariance, then performing ordinary least
squares (OLS) on each equation separately will provide consistent estimates of the parameters
(a0 – a7, ß0 – ß8).  However, the estimated parameters in (5) will be inconsistent otherwise (e.g.,
Lahiri and Schmidt, 1978).  Hausman (1978) demonstrates that his test for misspecification is
appropriate to test for zero covariance between the error terms.  For this study, we performed the
version of the Hausman test proposed by Davidson and MacKinnon (1993). We used POP,
                                                                                                                                                            
which may help to explain why these variables were never individually statistically significant.  For example, our
data include only three zip codes in Arlington County.
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HOUSE, INCOME, AGE, and KIDS as instruments for N.  We assume these instruments to be
related to N, but any linear combination of them to be exogenous to P.  We failed to reject the
null hypothesis that OLS provides consistent estimates of the parameters in (5). The coefficient
on the first stage residuals was 0.0036 with a standard error of 0.0137 (P-Value = 0.7917).
Estimating the triangular system of equations (4) and (5) using a seemingly unrelated
regressions (SUR) procedure is an unrestricted approach compared with estimating each
equation separately by OLS.  Moreover, it has been shown that, even if N were endogenous in
the equation for P, iterated SUR will provide consistent and efficient parameter estimates,
“ignoring the simultaneity” Greene (pg. 736-37).  This result is attributed to Lahiri and Schmidt
(1978).  Thus, we estimated (4) and (5) using an iterated SUR procedure.19
A second consideration was the potential for collinearity among explanatory variables.
Graddy (1997) encountered this problem and concedes that it may have affected some of her
estimation results.  Indeed, in this study, there is also a significant correlation among many of the
proxies for costs and demand conditions.  A correlation matrix is provided in Table 2.   Among
variables sharing a potentially troublesome correlation, for example, are INCOME and HOUSE.
Housing prices tend to be greater in markets with higher income households.
Because multicollinearity between explanatory variables can affect estimation results
(Greene, 1997), we report results from entering transportation cost, marginal cost, fixed cost, and
demand variables sequentially in Table 3.  The first pair of columns contains estimation results
when only transportation costs are included in the model.  The second pair of columns provides
the estimated coefficients and their standard errors, when variables controlling for marginal costs
are added to those for transportation costs.  By contrast, the third, fourth, and fifth pairs of
                                                
19 To be sure, estimation by OLS, iterated SUR, and even two-stage least squares (TSLS) yielded similar results.
OLS and TSLS results are available from the authors upon request.
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columns contain all variables in the structural model except proxies for demand conditions, fixed
costs, and marginal costs, respectively.  Estimation results for the full empirical model that most
closely approximates the structural model of Salop (1979) are contained in the sixth pair of
columns in Table 3.
Finally, we supplement the model in specification 6 with BLACK and HISPANIC which
measure the proportion of households considering themselves to belong to each group, and are
derived from Census 2000.20  While not strictly suggested by Salop’s theoretical model, we
include them in our empirical model for the sake of comparison with past studies and to
determine whether some form of price discrimination might be taking place.  These estimation
results are presented in the Table 4.
5. Findings
The data appear to fit the model well.  As shown in the first five pairs of columns in
Table 3, coefficients on explanatory variables change little in sign or magnitude across
specifications.  Note that INCOME is not statistically significant when HOUSE is not included
(specification 4).  Because the variables INCOME and HOUSE are positively correlated, but
their coefficients have opposing signs in theory, it is likely that without HOUSE, INCOME is
biased toward zero.  For the empirical specification that most closely approximates Salop’s
theory, as shown in the final pair of columns in Table 3, the value of R2 in the equation for N is
                                                
20 It could be argued that these racial and ethnic variables belong among the proxies for demand conditions.
However, Stewart et al (2004), Byrne et al (1998), and McCracken and Brandt (1987) do not find a statistically
significant relationship between being Black and a household’s spending for fast food.  However, Byrne et al (1998)
and Stewart et al (2004) find that Hispanic households may have a slightly elevated demand for fast food.
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0.338 and that in the equation for P is 0.708.21  We now examine the results for this specification,
and then consider the impact of supplementing the empirical specification of our structural
model with racial and ethnic variables.
Among our estimation results for equation (4), we find that the number of restaurants in a
market is decreasing in fixed costs, as the coefficient on HOUSE is negative and significant at
the 5 percent level.  In particular, we find that an increase in the median price of a home of
$100,000 will cause a market to have about 0.33 fewer restaurants.  Theoretically, if fixed costs
rise and demand is held constant, there is a decrease in the number of restaurants who can make
a normal economic profit in a market.
 There is also empirical evidence that the number of restaurants is increasing in the
aggregate demand for fast food.  For example, the coefficient on POP is positive and significant
at the 5 percent level.  An increase in population size of 10,000 people will cause the number of
fast food restaurants in a market to rise by about 0.7 establishments.  INCOME is also
statistically significant at the 10 percent level, if we control for HOUSE.  In general, if demand
rises and fixed costs are held constant, there is an increase in the number of restaurants that can
make a normal economic profit in a market. To be sure, this result is best interpreted as a short-
run effect.  It is unlikely that, in the long run, real estate prices would remain constant following
an increase in a market’s population or in the income of its residents.
The results may be better understood with a simple example.  Consider the number of
restaurants in zip code 20837, Poolesville, and in zip code 20705, Beltsville. Both communities
are relatively large when measured in total area.  Poolesville occupies 43.29 square miles of
                                                
21 Calculated for each equation using the estimated SUR coefficients.  As shown in Table 3, the resulting values of
R2 do not necessarily decrease for both equations, if a variable is removed from the model.  This counter-intuitive
result can occur because we are minimizing the generalized sum of squares, and is among the many short-comings
associated with measures of R2 in generalized linear models (e.g., Greene, 1997).
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suburban Maryland while Beltsville accounts for 19.23 square miles.  However, a retailer’s fixed
costs are likely to be higher in Poolesville.  The median value of a home is about $265,000 in
Poolesville as compared with about $146,000 in Beltsville.  Demand may also be greater in
Beltsville where about 23,000 people live.  The total population of Poolesville is just 6,000.  The
implication is that, although Beltsville is smaller in area, its lower fixed costs and higher
aggregate demand support five of the selected fast food establishments, while market
characteristics in Poolesville support only one.
Our estimation results for equation (5) (specification 6, column P) suggest that the
average price of fast food is decreasing in the number of restaurants. The coefficient on Nm is
negative and statistically significant at the 5 percent level.  The entry of a firm into a market
brings down the average price of a meal by about $0.02. However, arguably, this change in price
is small relative to the total price of a meal. On this matter, our study appears to agree with
Graddy (1997) who finds that restaurants in markets with three or fewer fast food outlets charge
about 2.4 percent more than stores in zip codes with four or more outlets.
It further follows from the statistical significance of the coefficient on Nm in equation (5)
that a relationship exists between prices and spatial differences in costs and demand conditions.
We can calculate the marginal effect of a variable in equation (4) on the price. First consider the
marginal effect of HOUSE.  Theory predicts that increases in fixed costs should drive firms out
of a market and prices may go up.  In fact, we find that
.0063.0)3315.0)(0190.0(
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A $100,000 increase in the median price of a home implies an increase of almost $0.01 in the
average price of a meal.   Furthermore, using the means presented in Table 1, it is possible to
calculate the elasticity of price with respect to the median cost of housing.  Doing so, we find
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that a 10 percent increase in median housing prices causes a 0.04 percent increase in fast food
prices. Similarly, it could be asked whether prices are relatively higher in lower income
neighborhoods.  That is, the marginal effect of INCOME is, i.e.,
.0053.0)2788.0)(0190.0(
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In words, a $10,000 increase in the median income of a market’s residents will cause the average
price of a bundled meal to decrease by less than $0.01.  As measured in terms of an elasticity, a
10 percent increase in the median income of households is associated with a 0.08 percent
decrease in fast food prices.
Our results further appear to agree with Graddy (1997) on the marginal effects of
INCOME and HOUSE.  Graddy (1997) also finds that prices are increasing with the cost of
housing and, controlling for housing costs, decreasing in the median income of residents. For
instance, in some specifications of her model, Graddy (1997) finds that a 10 percent increase in
the median income of a zip code’s residents is associated with a 1.57 percent decrease in the
price of a fast food meal.
On the subject of the racial and ethnic composition of markets, our study does not agree
with the results of Graddy (1997).  As shown in Table 4, when racial and ethnic variables are
added to our model, controlling for costs and demand conditions, we find no evidence that prices
are higher, or access is more limited, in neighborhoods with a greater proportion of minority
residents.  The coefficients on BLACK and HISPANIC are not statistically significant.  There
are several possible explanations for why the two studies differ on this result.  Arguably, because
both analyses are case studies of two different urban areas, each could be a regional
phenomenon.  For example, there could be differences in how racial and ethnic variables happen
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to be correlated with proxies for costs or demand conditions, which we have found to influence
the number of firms in a market.22
While many of our results agree with those of Graddy (1997), we believe it is interesting
to compare the results of estimating our empirical specification of (1) and (2) simultaneously
with results of estimating an empirical specification for our reduced form equation (3), when the
racial and ethnic variables, BLACK and HISPANIC, are again included in the model.  As shown
in table 5, the direction of the marginal effects on key variables does not change.  However, we
find that fewer of the variables are statistically significant.  For instance, the estimated
coefficient on HOUSE is positive while the coefficients on INCOME and POP are negative.
However, only HOUSE and POP are significant at the 5 or 10 percent levels, while INCOME
becomes insignificant. Arguably, the greater shortcoming associated with estimating a reduced
form model is that this approach provides no insights into why fast food prices are lower in
communities with less expensive housing or greater population levels.  In contrast, our structural
equations clearly show the mechanism at work.
6. Conclusions
We utilize a unique set of data to estimate a model of accessibility and pricing among fast food
restaurants in metropolitan Washington, DC.  We find that the socio-demographic profile of a
community influences the number, and therefore the accessibility, of fast food restaurants in that
market, and prices may move slightly through spatial differences in access.  We also compare
our results on price dispersion with the findings of a past study.  In general, we find quite a lot of
                                                
22 In fact, Graddy (1997) concedes that the inclusion of racial variables in her model affects the significance of some
proxies for costs.
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agreement between our study and the past analysis.  One notable exception is the effect of race
and ethnicity.
The model tested in this study allows for a much richer interpretation of the results than
do models tested in past analyses.  As a final illustrative exercise, we consider two hypothetical
markets and assume that consumers in both markets have the same aggregate demand for fast
food, but fixed costs are higher in one market than in the other.  We denote these markets as the
“high-cost” and “low-cost” markets respectively.  Next, assuming all else constant, we use the
results of this study to argue that N is decreasing in C, i.e., CostLowCostHigh NN -- < .  It follows that
individual firms in the high-cost market are likely serving more meals than individual firms in
the low-cost market.  Recall our assumption that firms incur a constant marginal cost of
production.  Based on this assumption, it follows that the average cost of production will decline
with output.  As such, it is possible that firms in the high-cost market have about the same
average cost as firms in the low-cost market.  The former spread these fixed costs over more
meals.  Finally, because price equals average cost is an equilibrium condition, it follows that
prices need not vary much with fixed costs.  It would be sufficient that the number of firms
varies, thereby explaining the findings of this study and other researchers of little variation in
average prices with proxies for costs and demand.
However, even if the impact is small, we do find that average prices vary with fixed costs
and demand. Continuing with our above example, we know that consumers in the high-cost
market will have less access, continuing to hold all other factors constant.  In turn, restaurants in
the community have fewer competitors and, thus, more market power.  To be sure, we again note
that the extent of this later impact appears to be small. Prices move only slightly with differences
in accessibility.
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This study has examined accessibility and pricing for fast food, because the authors
believe that such an analysis may be more easily undertaken than studies of grocery prices.
However, it follows that the results of this study cannot be readily extended to explaining the
conduct of supermarkets or even other types of restaurant, such as full-service ones.  That would
require controlling for differences in store formats and differences in the qualities of goods sold.
Therefore, a goal of future analysis might be to incorporate such factors into a structural model
of monopolistic competition whose results are easily interpreted.
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Table 1.
Means, Standard Deviations, and Definitions of Variables
VARIABLE MEAN ST. DEV. DEFINITION
ENDOGENEOUS :
     P 4.2216 0.1741 Average price of a meal among sampled establishments
     N 3.0825 1.6812 Number of restaurants belonging to one of three chains under study
FIXED COSTS:
     HOUSE 2.5273 1.5164 Median price of home ($100,000)
DEMAND CONDITIONS :
     POP 2.7854 1.3530 Number of Residents  (10,000 people)
     INCOME 6.5029 2.2998 Median Household Income ($10,000)
     AGE 35.4718 3.8933 Median Age of Residents
     KIDS 0.2838 0.1025 Proportion of Households with Live-at-Home Children
OTHER TRANSPORTATION COSTS :
     RURAL 0.1237 0.3310 Equals 1 if outside Beltway and residents per sq. mile < 1,500 ; 0 otherwise
     CITY 0.1237 0.3310 Equals 1 if within Beltway and residents per sq. mile > 9,000 ; 0 otherwise
     SUBURBAN 0.7526 0.4338 Omitted reference
MARGINAL COSTS:
     MNT 0.2474 0.4338 Equals 1 if Montgomery County, MD; 0 otherwise
     PG 0.2371 0.4276 Equals 1 if Prince George's County, MD; 0 otherwise
     VA 0.3402 0.4762 Equals 1 if Virginia; 0 otherwise
     DC 0.1753 0.3822 Omitted reference
     WNDY 0.1359 0.1951 Proportion of Restaurants Belonging to Wendy's in Calculation of P
     BK 0.1336 0.2439 Proportion of Restaurants Belonging to Burger King in Calculation of P
     MCD 0.7305 0.2843 Omitted Variable
RACE and ETHNICITY:
     HISPANIC 0.1045 0.0837 Proportion of Residents Considering Themselves to be Hispanic
     BLACK 0.2993 0.2944 Proportion of Residents Considering Themselves to be Black
Table 2.
Unconditional Correlation Matrix, Selected Independent Variables
RURAL CITY POP INCOME KIDS AGE HOUSE BLACK HISPANIC
RURAL 1.0000
CITY -0.1412 1.0000
POP -0.2831 0.0393 1.0000
INCOME 0.1320 -0.4044 -0.0129 1.0000
KIDS 0.3671 -0.3938 0.1825 0.4651 1.0000
AGE -0.0151 -0.1824 0.0154 0.6553 0.1174 1.0000
HOUSE -0.1052 -0.0636 -0.0154 0.6961 -0.0105 0.5596 1.0000
BLACK 0.0946 0.1683 0.2523 -0.5503 0.0319 -0.2344 -0.4776 1.0000
HISPANIC -0.2489 0.2522 0.0333 -0.2548 -0.2020 -0.2221 -0.1386 -0.3066 1.0000
      Table 3.
      Estimated Coefficients, Standard Errors, and Measures of Goodness-of- fita
                              Spec. 1                        Spec. 2                Spec. 3                      Spec. 4              Spec. 5                     Spec. 6
N P N P N P N P N P N P
INTERCEPT 3.1096* 4.2605* 3.1096* 4.2001* 3.8211* 4.3165* 8.0686* 4.1845* 7.3575* 4.2865* 7.4548* 4.2056*
(0.1982) (0.0374) (0.1982) (0.0333) (0.3182) (0.0341) (1.6344) (0.0334) (1.6120) (0.0374) (1.6184) (0.0334)
MNT 0.0641** 0.0650** 0.0606** 0.0664**
(0.0357) (0.0354) (0.0357) (0.0357)
VA -0.0052 -0.0048 -0.0048 -0.0047
(0.0324) (0.0320) (0.0324) (0.0324)
PG 0.0604** 0.0746** 0.0576 0.0624
(0.0377) (0.0376) (0.0377) (0.0377)
WNDY -0.1953* -0.1805* -0.2026* -0.1921*
(0.0578) (0.0574) (0.0577) (0.0578)
BK 0.4769* 0.4732* 0.4773* 0.4760*
(0.0432) (0.0428) (0.0431) (0.0432)
CITY 0.1404 0.1413* 0.1404 0.1238* 0.0416 0.1344* -0.4900 0.1211* -0.2276 0.1424* -0.2414 0.1254*
(0.5276) (0.0523) (0.5276) (0.0355) (0.5149) (0.0409) (0.5057) (0.0356) (0.5117) (0.0525) (0.5122) (0.0355)
RURAL -0.3596 -0.0118 -0.3596 -0.0625** -0.5035 -0.0810* 0.7076 -0.0585** 0.6094 -0.0148 0.6203 -0.0642**
(0.5276) (0.0524) (0.5276) (0.0325) (0.5162) (0.0384) (0.5199) (0.0326) (0.5137) (0.0526) (0.5141) (0.0325)
N -0.0178** -0.0167* -0.0559* -0.0197** -0.0262* -0.0190*
(0.0102) (0.0063) (0.0062) (0.0063) (0.0102) (0.0063)
HOUSE -0.2697* -0.3496* -0.3315*
(0.0959) (0.1620) (0.1627)
POP 0.0623* 0.0649* 0.6511*
(0.0122) (0.0120) (0.1203)
INCOME 0.0100 0.0284* 0.2788**
(0.0102) (0.0141) (0.1415)
KIDS -0.0490* -0.0638* -0.0636*
(0.0196) (0.0212) (0.0213)
AGE -0.1693* -0.1490* -0.1523*
(0.0522) (0.0514) (0.0516)
R2 0.006 0.100 0.006 0.708 0.068 0.572 0.309 0.683 0.338 0.093 0.338 0.708
        * = statistically significant at the 5 percent level, ** = statistically significant at the 10 percent level.
        Notes: a) R2 calculated using the estimated SUR coefficients.  Because we are minimizing the generalized sum of squares, the value of R2 does not necessarily decrease for both equations,
                       if a variable is removed from the model.   This counter-intuitive result is among the many short-comings associated with R2 in  generalized linear models (e.g., Greene, 1997).
              Table 4.
Estimated Coefficients and Standard Errors, including Race and Ethnicity
N P
INTERCEPT 8.1717* 4.2217*
(1.6919) (0.0394)
MNT 0.0473
(0.0393)
VA -0.0251
(0.0376)
PG 0.0711**
(0.0399)
WNDY -0.1873*
(0.0585)
BK 0.4779*
(0.0433)
CITY -0.1472 0.1312*
(0.5235) (0.0393)
RURAL 0.4879 -0.0621**
(0.5303) (0.0335)
N -0.0159*
(0.0063)
HOUSE -0.3304*
(0.1635)
POP 0.6429*
(0.1270)
INCOME 0.2839
(0.1805)
KIDS -0.0609*
(0.0230)
AGE -0.1652*
(0.0555)
BLACK 0.0003 -0.0006
(0.0088) (0.0005)
HISPANIC -0.0227 0.0001
(0.0231) (0.0014)
R2 0.34 0.71
                                * = statistically significant at the 5% level, ** = 10% level
Table 5.
Estimated Coefficients and Standard Errors, Reduced Form
  
P
INTERCEPT 4.2657
(0.1323)*
MNT 0.0888
(0.0505)**
VA 0.0027
(0.0505)
PG 0.0844
(0.0529)
WNDY -0.1987
(0.0612)*
BK 0.4473
(0.0449)*
RURAL -0.0676
(0.0397)**
CITY 0.1172
(0.0411)*
HOUSE 0.0261
(0.0126)*
POP -0.0168
(0.0096)**
INCOME -0.0084
(0.0147)
BLACK -3.87 x 10-5
(0.0008)
HISPANIC 0.0004
(0.0018)
KIDS 0.0562
(0.1704)
AGE -0.0031
(0.0045)
R2 0.719
* = statistically significant at the 5% level, ** = 10% level
Figure 1.
The Observed Dispersion of Fast Food Prices
Most Frequently Observed Price(s): $4.09, $4.19
 Most Frequently Observed Price(s): $4.79
Notes:
1) Prices are pre-tax sales prices.
2) The height of the bar indicates the number of retailers charging a price within the indicated range.  For example, the height
of the first bar in the  table corresponding to McDonald’s indicates that a dozen of these restaurants were charging $3.89 or
less.  The height of the second bar illustrates that twenty McDonald’s restaurants were charging between $3.90 and $3.99.
However, as shown by the height of the third and fourth bars, we most frequently observed prices between $4.00 and $4.19.
3) Notably, a majority of prices were observed at the upper-end of the depicted price ranges.  In other words, more prices
ended in a nine, such as $3.99, than in any other number like one ($3.91) or two ($3.92 ).
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